

Counterfeit as a global phenomenon: the emerging threats and the routes of fakes

Massimo Antonelli Seconded National Expert European Observatory on infringements of intellectual property rights EUIPO



CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

- 1. Why routes are complex
- 2. Emerging threats: key product sectors
- 3. The Free Trade Zones



2 main sources have been used for this presentation





P EUIPO



Joint analysis and threat assessment on counterfeit EUIPO/EUROPOL 2017 and 2019






3




Mapping the Real Routes of Trade in Fake Goods EUIPO/OECD 2017





All publications of the Observatory can be downloaded freely from the website

https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/web/observatory/home





Emerging threats: IP crime and associated crimes are evolving continuously

- Factors:
 - counterfeiters tend to follow the market (offer and demand)
 - counterfeiters tend to make itinerary and supply chain more complicate to disguise authorities
 - counterfeiters react to enforcement and change their strategies



The response of the authorities is not always up to it, and the fight against fakes must be better supported

General trend worldwide – and in Europe in particular – is to decrease efforts against counterfeit

- IP crime is currently not among priorities of policy makers in the EU. Possible reasons:
 - o it's a victimless crime?
 - o it only affects luxury industry?
 - o there are few resources and they must be concentrated on other crime priorities?




On the contrary:

- IP crime is a multi-crime phenomenon
 - money laundering
 - drugs and human trafficking
 - funding terrorism
 - and many others
- Fakes can jeopardize human health and environmental quality
- Counterfeit now affects all kind of everyday goods not only luxury goods



THE SITUATION AT THE EUROPEAN UNION'S BORDERS



Year	Number of cases
2015	81 098
2016	63 184
2017	57 433
2018	69 354


Chart 3. Number of registered cases



European Commission (DG TAXUD) - Report on the EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights: results at the EU border, 2018



THE SITUATION AT THE EUROPEAN UNION'S BORDERS



Year	Number of articles
2015	40 728 675
2016	41 387 132
2017	31 410 703
2018	26 720 827



BUT LESS ITEMS SEIZED

European Commission (DG TAXUD) - Report on the EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights: results at the EU border, 2018



THE ROUTES OF FAKES ARE COMPLEX ONES

The use of complex trade routes with transshipment points is standard practice in all international trade (economically justified):

- many ports are not directly connected with one shipping line, so that the shipment needs to be broken down and shipped in several legs
- the mode of transport changes during the journey
- consolidation (combining small shipments into a larger one) or deconsolidation (dividing a large shipment into smaller ones)



THE ROUTES OF FAKES ARE COMPLEX ONES

But for counterfeiters, complex routes are used to avoid enforcement (not economically justified)

- Why:
 - most important hubs used: it makes it easier to hide oneself
 - choosing weaker governance systems with less controls
 - trying to involve many intermediaries
 - extensive use of transit points
 - misuse of free trade zones



THE ROUTES OF FAKES ARE COMPLEX ONES


Decision on which route to follow can be taken by criminal organisations acting in complex transport and distribution networks

- OCG have skills, network and resources to:
 - effectively react to enforcement and change way
 - identify weak points in controls capacity
 - identify gaps in terms of legality
 - ➤ where local criminal organisations are already active or can provide support – the case of Italy



TRANSSHIPMENT AND CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS

Port of Gioia Tauro (Italy), transshipment and the «'ndrangheta»





USE OF TRANSIT

Transit points and **transit customs regime** offer great opportunities to counterfeiters

- Transit is used for:
 - falsification of documents to camouflage real provenance
 - establishing distribution and sorting centres of fakes
 - re-packaging/label of products
 - transit regime is usually less controlled



USE OF TRANSIT


Main transit hubs identified:

- globally
 - Hong Kong (China)
 - Singapore
 - United Arab Emirate
- more sensitive for the EU
 - Hong Kong (China)
 - United Arab Emirate
 - Albania
 - Morocco
 - o Egypt
 - Ukraine



EMERGING THREATS: KEY PRODUCT SECTORS

EUROPOL-EUIPO IP CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 2019: areas covered





ELECTRONICS

- EU 2015 to 2017: increasing seizures of mobile phones and accessories (chargers mainly) and computers and accessories
- More items seized but less seizures: traffic shifted from small consignments to maritime containers (though chargers bought on e-market places still is a threat)
- EU 2017: increase in **semiconductors mostly from Hong Kong and China**:
 - usually via postal services and express couriers (very small objects)
 - many cases of EU transit for the USA
 - high safety risk




ELECTRONICS





- Constantly increasing, 25% of all seized items in the EU Customs in 2017
- Different kind of IPR can be infringed: trade marks, geographical indications, design
- Quality food, but also sweets and chewing gums, and meats (health risk), pasta and tea
 - frequently seized in grocery stores: high infiltration of the legal supply chain (role of wholesalers and unaware re-sellers)
- Some EU countries are frequently producing economies for export, including to China







CASE STUDY – Fake quality wine in Italian region Tuscany

February 2017, operation of the Italian Carabinieri on counterfeited GI wine:
 11.000 bottles of «Tignanello» wine seized





CASE STUDY – Fake quality wine in Italian region Tuscany





CASE STUDY – Fake milk powder for China markets

- In «OPSON VI» 2017/2018: milk powder manufactured in the EU, purchased on-line and sold to China (8 tons seized)
- Organised crime group specialised on food





CASE STUDY – Operation «ROSSO ORIENTALE» Italian food, August 2019

- Italian Customs Agency and the Guardia di Finanza (financial police)
- 8 tons seized

imported at Genova port for the Italian market

shipped by maritime transport from the Philippines



- The most popular and critical (especially in Europe): clothing and shoes mainly
- Mostly ordered on on-line marketplace and shipped separately as small consignment – postal services and express couriers
 - difficulties in risk analysis with little available information collaboration with intermediaries is needed
- Among luxury gods, watches are far the most seized in Europe in 2017 provenance Asia
 - including of high value: 30% of the total value of items seized in EU in
 2017 (number 1)




ROUTES OF CLOTHING





ROUTES OF FOOTWEAR





• Emerging threat in clothing: increasing trade of labels and packaging materials from China and other Asian Countries to Europe for use in domestic production of counterfeit - CASE STUDY Operation PINAR (Spain)





CASE STUDY – Operation PINAR (Spain)

- EUROPOL and the Spanish National Police, 2016
- international OCG dismantled in the textile and clothing sector
 - 71 arrested
 - 6 premises searched
 - 150 bank accounts seized
 - 2 stamping plates and documents



CASE STUDY – Operation PINAR (Spain)

- 3 organised groups with no leadership
 - horizontal organisation, all sharing the network, infrastructures and contacts
- 2 modi operandi:
 - import from Turkey, China and Portugal
 - domestic production




Las autoridades han intervenido 264.980 productos que vulneran los derechos de propiedad industrial



- Constantly increasing about 14% of pesticides market of the EU according to the European Crop Protection Association
- Different kinds of IPR can be infringed: trade mark and patent
- Highly risky for health and safety
 - not tested
 - sometimes toxic, sometimes ineffective
 - impact on land and water (risk of infiltration)
 - risk for farmers and consumers



CASE STUDY – Operation SILVERAXE III 2018




https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/largest-ever-seizure-of-illegal-or-counterfeit-pesticides-in-europol-silver-axe-operation



CASE STUDY – Operation SILVERAXE III 2018

- EUROPOL and the EU Member States + the European Antifraud Office OLAF
- checks at major seaports, airports and land borders, as well as production and repacking facilities





CASE STUDY – Operation SILVERAXE III 2018

- Modi operandi
 - import of the main chemical component in bulk to be processed at destination
 - fraudulent import declaration (smuggling the pesticide)
 - boxes or bottles bearing trade marks or logos shipped separately from the chemical
- Export from the EU in some cases:
 - Moldova
 - Russia
 - Turkey
 - Ukraine



PHARMACEUTICALS

- Growing threat to human health due to purchases on-line and shipment in small parcels
 - increasing use of illegal e-pharmacies and social media
 - cases also in the darkweb; cases reported in the UK of unsafe Xanax bought in the darkweb
- Most counterfeited:
 - erectile dysfunction medicines (e.g., Viagra)
 - performance enhancing drugs: anabolic steroid and doping substances
 - hypnotic
 - slimming pills
 - HIV related medicines



- India on top, then China and Singapore as producing economy
- Turkey is emerging as source of hormonal substances
- Hong Kong (China), UAE and Albania among major transit hubs





CASE STUDY – Operation PANGEA XI 2018 on illicit sales of medicines on-line



Police, customs and health regulatory authorities from 116 countries targeted the illicit online sale of medicines and medical products during INTERPOL's Operation Pangea XI.

The operation resulted in 859 arrests w potentially dangerous pharmaceuticals



CASE STUDY – Operation PANGEA XI 2018 on illicit sales of medicines on-line

- Figures of the operation
 - 116 Countries
 - 500 tons seized
 - USD 14 million worth of potentially dangerous medicines
 - 3,671 web pages closed down (including social media pages)



CASE STUDY – Operation PANGEA XI 2018 on illicit sales of medicines on-line

- Modi operandi:
 - smuggling product through concealment (in other shipment or objects)
 - Poland: in DVD boxes
 - Ireland: in empty books
 - with false declaration at the customs:
 - Argentina: 4 million pills of Ipobrufen declared as "samples"
 - UK: 150,000 slipping pills declared as clothing etc.



TOBACCO PRODUCTS

- Growing domestic production in the EU, with 74 local plants dismantled in 2017-2018 and 429 million counterfeited cigarettes seized
- The web is used significantly for buying both products and raw material to be processed at destination (including cigarettes via social media)
- OCG are active in this sector and they are traditionally often involved also in other crimes: migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, forgery of documents, money laundering and tax evasion



TOBACCO PRODUCTS

- Modi operandi:
 - import/export of raw tobacco to be processed into cigarettes at destination: x-ray machines hardly can distinguish from other agricultural products
 - o boxes, filters, cigarette paper and equipments are imported separately from tobacco to elude controls by the customs
 - purchase of tobacco leaves on-line



TOBACCO PRODUCTS

- **Vietnam** and **China** as producing economies
- The Eastern border is the closest threat for the EU: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as producing economies





- Increasing globally (422,218 items seized in the EU in 2017)
- High safety risk!



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KvgWDxrIKKg



- A wide range of car and vehicle parts are counterfeited:
 - airbags, alloy rims, brakes pads, fuel pumps, master cylinders, radiators etc.
- Emerging threats: oil, fuel, pollen and air **filters** massively detected in the EU in 2018:
 - very profitable market
 - large offer on-line, for the consumer to order the single needed item directly
 - shipped in small parcel by post or express courier
- Main producing economies:
 - Turkey
 - China



CASE STUDY – Operation RENEGADE 2017

A Joint Customs Operation involving Europe and Asian Countries on car parts



PRESS RELEASE No 11/2017

26/06/2017

Operation Renegade halts thousands of potentially dangerous auto spare parts and other counterfeit goods

Over 70,000 counterfeit auto spare parts, including grills, oil and air filters, and fuel numbs, along with 500 cylinders of CEC refrigerant commonly used in air-



CASE STUDY – Operation RENEGADE 2017

- The figures of the operation
 - o more than 70,000 items seized
 - about 400 containers checked in Europe and Asian ports
 - 56 million cigarettes (accounting for €12 million loss in customs duties and taxes)
 - o 668 kg of cocaine



CASE STUDY – Operation RENEGADE 2017

- Excellent example of Europe-Asia partnership
 - the operation has been carried out within the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) framework
 - Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, Norway, China and Europol
 - Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Lao, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam collaborated in the operational phase



LABESL AND PACKAGING MATERIAL

- Trade of counterfeit packaging is the sign of:
 - the existence of domestic productions
 - the existence of organised structures with delocalised activities
- It is horizontal: affecting all categories of product
- The figures:
 - globally: more than 5,000 seizures of labels in 2014-2016 and more than 3,100 seizures of packaging materials
 - in the EU: 1,051 cases in 2017 with about 3,350,000 items seized



LABESL AND PACKAGING MATERIAL

- Modi operandi
 - separate importation of unbranded product and labels/packaging:
 - in the same shipment
 - in different shipment
 - local production of labels and packaging to be attached to:
 - products which have been imported unbranded
 - locally manufactured products
 - products and labels/packaging assembled in customs warehouses, in transhipment, in free trade zones or other situations with reduced surveillance



«Complex routes» of IP infringers often include a Free Trade Zone (FTZ)

• FTZ is a tool for a government **to boost economy**, by facilitating business and international trade in national ports, favoring investments, employment and welfare



- FTZs are designated areas (usually closed physically) that lie outside the customs jurisdiction of the country where they are located
 - no customs duties
 - o no other customs or administrative procedure otherwise applicable to import
 - generally reduced surveillance



- Size of the FTZ can vary: from single warehouses to big complexes comprising thousands of businesses, and even whole harbors
- Permitted activities in the FTZ:
 - storing
 - assembling
 - packaging
 - manufacturing etc.
 - mainly for export



- Studies of the OECD and the EUIPO confirm that there is a link between
 FTZs and trade in counterfeit products: 5,9% increase in exports of illicit goods when a FTZ is established in one country
- Benefits offered to counterfeiters by transhipment into a FTZ:
 - possibility to hide the real origin of the cargo
 - possibility to manipulate goods at low surveillance (or with no surveillance)
 - light regulation of business activities in the zone



A FREE TRADE ZONE'S PROFILE





A FREE TRADE ZONE'S PROFILE

The Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone (Jafza) in Dubai

- created in 1985
- over 7,000 companies from more than 100 countries
- over 144,000 workers employed

It accounts for more than 32% of the United Arab Emirates' foreign direct investment, and more than 50% of Dubai's exports





A FREE TRADE ZONE'S PROFILE

The Jebel Ali Free Trade Zone (Jafza) in Dubai

For investors, the zone offers the following:

- 100% foreign ownership
- 0% corporate tax for 50 years (renewable)
- no restrictions on capital repatriation
- 0% import or re-export duties
- 0% personal income tax
- no currency restrictions
- onsite customs
- others





www.euipo.europa.eu





EUIPO

Thank you